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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No,
14192

-vsLYNN KING,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves the prosecution of appellant
for the crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance for value.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court and a guilty
verdict was rendered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the verdict of guilty
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was submitted to the trial court on

stipulated facts as contained in the transcript and
record.

The transcript indicates that three cases were

before the court, each relating to an alleged sale of a
controlled substance by the defendant to an undercover
agent (T.22-23).

The police records of the incidents

were entered into evidence by stipulation (T. 18).
The trial court found the defendant guilty in
two cases and not guilty in the third case.

The court

based its not guilty verdict as to the incident of
December 30, 1974, on a finding that defendant was
acting as the agent of the undercover officer rather
than the agent of the seller of the controlled substance
(T.22-23).
However, as to the incidents of January 10,
1975, and January 17, 1975, the court found that the
sales were in fact made by the defendant to the officer
and thus a guilty finding was entered by the court (T.23).
Defendant is herein appealing only one guilty
finding relating to the incident of January 10, 1975 (R.6).
Since the transcript merely incorporates the police
report without setting out the pertinent facts (T.21),
respondent believes the Supreme Court would find it helpful
if the facts relating to the incident of January 10, 1975,
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were here summarized from the police report and from the
transcript.
The police report on the incident of January10, 1975, reflects a meeting between defendant and
the undercover officer at the Big Union Bar in Salt
Lake City.

The two had met at least once before on

December 30, 1974, as defendant testified (T.21).
The officer asked defendant to "score" a lid of marijuana for the officer.

The defendant told the officer

to come by his house later that evening.

When the

officer arrived the defendant handed him a bag
containing marijuana (T.21).

The officer gave the

defendant a ten dollar bill but the defendant stated
that his friend wanted twelve dollars for the lid.
The officer gave defendant another two dollars.
Defendant then gave the money to an unidentified
individual in the room.

The officer then left defendant's

home.
The defendant testified that he did not make
any profit from the transaction of January 10, 1975 (T.23).
The clerk of the Supreme Court has informed
respondent that the undercover officer's report of the
incident appealed, that of January 10, 1975, is an
unnumbered part of the record in the instant case and
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is contained in a sealed envelope.

The envelope,, the

transcript and the record have all been filed together
under Supreme Court number 14192.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLANT ACTED AS THE
AGENT OF THE SELLER IN THE SALE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
FOR VALUE TO AN UNDERCOVER AGENT.
Appellant relies heavily upon the holding in
State v. Schultz, 28 Utah 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106 (1972),
in arguing that under Utah law one cannot be convicted
as a seller of drugs if he acts merely as the procuring
agent of the buyer in an illegal drug sale without
receiving any profit from the sale.

The Schultz case

and the numerous cases cited by appellant from jurisdictions other than Utah involved violations of the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, since repealed by the Utah
Legislature.
The instant case involves an action brought
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1953), as amended,
prohibiting the unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance for value.

A recent case also involving Utah
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Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) expands upon the holding in
State v. Schultz, supra, and offers additional guidelines
in interpreting whether one who procures drugs for another
can be convicted as the distributor of a controlled
substance for value.
Respondent submits that both this recent
decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Shupe,
P.2d

(Utah, 1976, No. 14136), and State v. Schultz,

supra, squarely support the conviction of appellant for the
offense of unlawfully distributing a controlled substance
for value.
As appellant points out, State v. Schultz, 27
Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (Utah 1972), was first before
the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of entrapment.
Schultz's conviction was affirmed.

On rehearing, the

issue of agency was raised and the Court found the
following facts pertinent:
1.

The defendant was induced by the undercover

officer to procure the controlled substance as the agent
of the officer.
2.

The defendant had no past association with

the actual seller.
3.

The defendant was not acting in concert

with the seller.
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4.

The defendant received no profit from the

transaction.
The existence of the aforementioned facts
required the reversal of Shultz's conviction as a seller
of a controlled substance for value.

A new trial was

ordered for Schultz requiring an instruction to the jury
on the issue of agency.
In

State v. Shupe, supra, the Court notes that

a claim that one acted as an agent of the police in
procuring drugs is closely akin to a claim of entrapment.
The crucial question is whether the crime is the result
of inducement by the officer rather than a product of the
defendant's own intent.

As provided by Utah Code Ann. §

76-2-303 (1953), as amended, conduct merely providing one
with the opportunity to commit a crime cannot constitute
the defense of entrapment.

.^

..

As always, cippellant's arguments must be reviewed
by the Supreme Court in a light most favorable to the
decision of the trial court.

Charlton v. Hackett, 11

Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).

The trial court clearly

measured the facts in the instant case against those in
Schultz in finding appellant guilty of the offense of
selling a controlled substance for value (T.23).
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The

facts relative to the incident of January 10, 1975,
are far removed from the facts in Schultz which led
the Supreme Court to conclude that Schultz was an agent
of the undercover officer rather than the agent of the
seller.
First, after the officer asked appellant if
a lid of marijuana could be purchased, appellant told
the officer to come by appellant's home a short time
later that evening.

The fact that appellant used his

own home as the place of the sale provides support for
the argument that he was acting as the agent of the
seller.
Secondly, after the undercover officer handed
appellant a ten dollar bill for the marijuana, appellant
stated that his friend wanted twelve dollars for the
lid.

The fact that appellant quickly stated that the

price was more than the officer offered certainly suggests
that appellant had a past association with the seller.
As to the third criterion set forth in
Schultz, appellant's knowledge of the price over and
above what the undercover officer expected to pay for
a lid of marijuana, and the use of appellant's house
for the transaction both strongly suggest that appellant
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and the seller were acting in concert.
Finally, the fourth factor of importance
considered in Schultz was whether the defendant
received a profit from the transaction.

Appellant

herein testified that he received no profit from
the sale of marijuana on January 10, 1975 (T.23).
The trial court found defendant's denial that he
shared on the profits from the sale to be an
unimportant factor in the court's decision.
Respondent would also point out the self-serving
nature of that testimony and urge the Supreme Court
to weigh the facts in the instant case against the
first three criteria in Schultz.
As the trial court concluded, the facts
in the police report on the incident of January 10,
1975, require the finding that appellant had the
intent to commit the crime charged as the agent
of the seller of the controlled substance.

Both

Schultz and Shupe require such a finding.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforementioned authorities and
argument, the verdict of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
-8- .
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